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YOU CAN'T HAVE YOUR CAKE AND EAT IT TOO:
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION SURVIVES
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
PATRICIA B. FRY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction, if a
debtor offers its creditor a sum of money in full settlement of a
disputed claim, and the creditor uses the offered sum,' the creditor
is bound by the proposal. 2 The creditor is held to have accepted the
settlement and the original claim is fully satisfied. Attempts by the
creditor to protest the full-payment condition of the offer will be
unsuccessful. The common law doctrine does not permit the
creditor to take the benefit of the offer without also accepting its
burdens.3
*Associate Professor of Law, University of North Dakota. J.D. Southwestern University, M.A.
California State University. Member Ad Hoc Committee on New Payments Code, Section of
Corporation, Banking and Business Law, American Bar Association.
1. The term "uses" is employed, rather than the word "negotiates" as defined in U.C.C.
section 3-202, because courts have held that an accord and satisfaction may occur when the creditor
has a check certified. See, e.g., Lange-Finn Constr. Co. v. Albany Steel & Iron Co., 403 N.Y.S.2d
1012, 1014, 94 Misc. 2d 15, -_ (Sup. Ct. 1978). Cf State Dep't of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25
Wash. App. 671, 680, 610 P.2d 390, 395 (1980) (accord and satisfaction may occur when creditor
retains check beyond a reasonable time).
2. The generally accepted ancestor case is Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605 (1882). In Foakes the
court ruled payment of a lesser sum did not discharge a larger debt because consideration was
lacking. Id. at 612 (citing Pinnel's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 237, - (C.P. 1602) (something else had to
be thrown into the bargain, a "horse, hawk or robe. ")) See also 6 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACT
51276 (1951); 15 W. JAEGER, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 5 1838 (3d ed. 1972); Very v. Levy, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 345, 357 (1851). American cases are collected at 34 A.L.R. 1035, 75 A.L.R. 904, 84
A.L.R.2d 504.
3.6 A. CORBIN, supra note 2, SS 1277, 1279.
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Some courts and writers have suggested that section 1-207 of
the Uniform Commercial Code has changed the common law
doctrine of accord and satisfaction.4 Section 1-207 provides:
A party who with explicit reservation of rights performs
or promises performance or assents to performance in a
manner demanded or offered by the other party does not
thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as
'without prejudice,' 'under protest' or the like are
sufficient .5
Certain readers have construed this language to mean that a
creditor who is offered an accord and satisfaction by means of a full-
payment check may use the check "under protest" or "without
prejudice" and not be bound by the settlement offered. 6 A New
York annotation to section 1-207 supports this interpretation. The
annotation specifically states that the Code provision overturns the
established doctrine of accord and satisfaction if the creditor
protests the full-payment condition before using or cashing the
check.7 Further support for this view appeared in the first edition of
the White and Summers' text on the Uniform Commercial Code,
which also construed section 1-207 to permit the creditor to avoid
the condition to the offered payment.8
4. See, e.g., J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 13-21 (1972).
5. U.C.C. § 1-207 (1978). All references to the Uniform Commercial Code are to the Official
Text, 1978, unless otherwise indicated.
6. E.g., Baillie Lumber Co., Inc. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342, __, 167
S.E.2d 85, 93 (1969).
7. See N.Y. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAW S 1-207 (McKinney 1964). The New York
annotation reads:
This section permits a party involved in a Code-covered transaction to accept
whatever he can get by way of payment, performance, etc., without losing his right to
demand the remainder of the goods, to set-off a failure of quality, or to sue for the
balance of the payment, so long as he explicitly reserves his rights.
Case law involving the issues dealt with in this section deal [sic] with the problem
in terms of the doctrine of consideration. Thus a distinction is drawn between
liquidated and unliquidated claims. In Nassoiy v. Tomlinson, 148 N.Y. 326, 42 N.E.
715 (1896), the debtor paid no more than the exact amount he claimed was due. The
court held that the conditional payment was payment of an unliquidated claim if any
part was disputed, and that the acceptance of the payment discharged the entire debt.
Compare Schuttinger v, Woodruff, 259 N.Y. 212, 181 N.E. 361 (1932), and Leidy v.
Proctor, 226 App. Div. 322, 235 N.Y.S. 101 (1929). The Code rule would permit, in
Code-covered transactions, the acceptance of a part performance or payment tendered
in full settlement without requiring the acceptor to gamble with his legal right to
demand the balance of the performance or payment.
Id.
8. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, §§ 13-21. This position was reiterated by the authors
in the second edition of their treatise. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13-21 (2d ed. 1980).
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Despite an early spate of decisions suggesting or holding that
section 1-207 alters the common law, and the extremely divergent
reasoning in many of the opinions, the common law doctrine now
survives intact in all but a handful of states. 9 Most state courts that
have considered the provision have concluded that it was not
intended to and does not affect a settlement offered by means of a
full-payment check. 10 This article will review the common law
doctrine of accord and satisfaction, analyze the meaning and
history of section 1-207 and its impact on the common law, and
then examine the judicial treatment of the issue.11
II. THE COMMON LAW
The doctrine of accord and satisfaction has long occupied an
honored niche in Anglo-American contract law. 12 Fundamental
principles of contract law, familiar to every lawyer, are applied in
the special setting of debtor-creditor disputes. An accord is an
executory contract, an agreement between two or more capable
parties supported by mutual assent and consideration. 13 Typically
the creditor has a claim that the debtor disputes. The debtor's offer
to pay a smaller sum now to settle the dispute and satisfy the claim
is the accord. The satisfaction occurs when the executory accord is
fully peformed. In the event of litigation, one of the parties asks the
court to enforce the accord, contending it is an enforceable contract
which has been or must be performed. 14
An accord and satisfaction is usually designed to settle a
pending dispute, frequently but not necessarily arising out of a pre-
existing contract between the parties. 15 The accord, like any
9. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 3d 54, , 184
Cal. Rptr. 436, 437-38, 34 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1, 6 (1982); Flambeau Prods. Corp. v. Honeywell
Information Sys., Inc., 116 Wis. 2d 95, , 341 N.W.2d 655, 664, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1441,
1451 (1984).
11. This Article addresses the debtor-creditor relationship only. Banks that process the full-
payment check have no obligation to verify that the creditor has in fact treated the underlying
obligation as satisfied. U.C .C. S 4-203. This author is in full agreement with the proposition that the
need for speed and efficiency in the bank collection system militates against imposing a duty on any
bank in the collection chain to verify whether or not the creditor has accepted the debtor's offer. See
City of Deerfield Beach v. Florida Nat'l Bank of Palm Beach County, 428 So. 2d 779, 780, 35
U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1218, 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
12. See Very v. Levy, 54 U.S. (13 How.)345 (1851).
13. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) CONTRACrS § 281 (1981).
14. 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 2, SS1271-75; 15 W. JAEGER, supra note 2 , § 1851-64.
15. See, e.g., Quaintance Assocs., Inc. v. PLM, Inc., 95 111. App. 3d 818, 821, 420 N.E.2d 567,
568 (1981) (dispute over terms of executive recruitment agreement); Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 47
Md. App. 110, -, 422 A.2d 16, 18 (1980) (customer broke tooth on frankfurter purchased from
grocery, full-payment check tendered by manufacturer's insurer); Gallagher Lumber Co. v. Shapiro,
137 Vt. 139, -, 400 A.2d 984, 985 (1979) (dispute over discounts on sales contract); Graffam v.
Geronda, 304 A.2d 76, 77 (Me. 1973) (dispute whether fuel oil sold or consigned to debtor).
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settlement or modification of contract rights, must be supported by
consideration before it will be enforceable. Modification of the
duties of one party to an agreement without modification of the
rights or duties of the other side will run afoul of the pre-existing
duty rule; the modification will be unenforceable for lack of
consideration.16 Normally, the consideration for a settlement
agreement is found in the assent of each party to accept something
less than it contends is its right or privilege. 17 Waiving the privilege
to litigate questions of liability or to have a court liquidate an
unliquidated claim is sufficient consideration for the settlement.18
As long as there is a bona fide dispute, it is not even necessary to
establish that there is reasonable doubt which party would succeed
at a trial. Consideration will exist if the claim is actually doubtful or
if the forbearing party believes the claim or defense is valid. 19 The
bona fide dispute may go to responsibility or to the amount of the
liability; as long as the claim is unliquidated as to either amount or
liability, its settlement will not be open to challenge on the ground
of lack of consideration. 2 0
16. See Hagerty Oil Co. v. Chester County Sec. Funds, Inc., 248 Pa. 456, -, 375 A.2d 186,
187 (1977) (debtor admitted liability for full amount claimed; court ruled no accord and satisfaction
occurred); Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605, 612 (1882). But cf., U.C.C. 5 1-107 (written waiver or
renunciation of a claim arising out of an alleged breach permitted without consideration); U.C.C. S
2-209 (modification of sales agreement may be made without consideration).
17. Because the common law doctrine is a special application of basic contract law, no accord
and satisfaction will occur if the creditor is not aware of the terms of the offer prior to using the full-
payment check. 6 A. CoRBIN, supra note 2, § 1277; 15 W. JAEGER, supra note 2, 5 1856.
The assent element would present problems if an electronic fund transfer were used, rather than
a check. The burden would be on the debtor to prove that, prior to receiving the fund transfer, the
creditor knew it was remitted on the condition it be accepted in full satisfaction. The same problem
would exist with any other mode of payment that did not take the form of a message delivered to the
creditor prior to the credit of funds to the creditor's account. For a discussion of such payment
systems and current attempts to draft a Uniform New Payments Code to regulate them, see Leary &
Fry, A "Systems "Approach to Payments Modes, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 283 (1984).
With respect to electronic fund transfers, the problem is compounded by proposals that
payment be final when notice of the fund transfer is received by the payee's depository institution
from the transmitting institutions. Id. at 308 n.73. If the creditor has no opportunity to reject a
transfer of credit prior to its receipt, it can hardly be said that receipt of the transferred credit is a
manifestation of assent. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (2) (1981). On the other
hand, the creditor's use of the funds could be construed as precisely such a manifestation of assent.
18.6 A. CORBIN, supra note 2, 5S 1278-88; Hawkland, The Effect of U C.C. J 1-207 on the Doctrine
of Accord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check, 74 CoM. L.J. 329, 330 (1969); Rosenthal, Discord
and Dissatisfaction: Section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 48, 53 (1978).
19. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 74 comment b, illustration 3 (1981). Illustration 3
to 5 74 presents the situation in which A, knowing B is married, cohabits with him for several years.
During that time B promises to marry her upon his divorce. A and B separate, and A surrenders any
claims based on the promise to marry in return for B's promise to pay her $1,000.00 per month for
life. If it is found A knew there was no valid claim, the promise is unenforceable. The necessary
implication is that the promise is enforceable ifA in good faith believed her claim valid. See also Fiege
v. Boehm, 210 Md. 352, 123 A.2d 316 (1956). In Fiege, the court enforced a man's promise to pay
birth expenses for a child both parties believed could be his, given in return for the mother's promise
not to file bastardy proceedings. Id. at __ , 123 A.2d at 319. As he later discovered, the child was
not his. Id.
20. In Canada the majority view is that no consideration is required to support an accord and
satisfaction. Many of the provincial legislatures have enacted statutes to this effect, and in some of
the other provinces the courts have come to the same conclusion. Thus payment of a lesser sum in
full satisfaction of a liquidated, undisputed, and due obligation satisfies the entire debt if accepted.
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Frequently a debtor offers to settle a claim by sending the
creditor a check for a smaller amount, accompanied by a letter
stating the claim is disputed and the check is offered in full
settlement of the account. Often the check bears some sort of legend
to the effect that it represents full payment of the account. 21
Sometimes the legend on the check is the only indication that the
debtor intended the payment to fully satisfy the account. If the
creditor then uses the check, the account will be deemed satisfied. If
the creditor nonetheless files suit to collect a balance claimed still to
be due, proof of the offer to settle and its acceptance by the creditor
(by using the check) will be a full defense for the debtor. 22
The common law treatment of accord and satisfaction has long
been accepted by nearly all American jurisdictions. A problem
arises, however, when the creditor uses the check or payment while
attempting to preserve the right to collect any balance. In some
cases, after the creditor receives the check and any accompanying
letters or vouchers, the creditor crosses out the language about full-
payment and, perhaps, even writes something like "under protest"
beneath the crossed-out words. The creditor then uses the check.23
The common law courts had little difficulty with this behavior.
Because the payment was offered on the condition that the creditor
accept the check as payment in full, the only way the creditor could
use the payment was by accepting the condition. The creditor's
choice was eithe" to agree or to return the payment. "[I]t is the
deed rather than the thought that counts .... ",24 Rejecting a bird in
the hand may be the "exquisite torture" described by Professors
White and Summers, 25 but lawyers and their clients face this
dilemma daily. Deciding whether to take what is now available or
Brenner, Part Payment of a Debt by Accord and Satisfaction.- The Canadian Experience, 18 U.W. ONT. L.
REV. 369, 386 (1980). Cf U.C.C. S 3-802(3) (1977).
21. A quick descriptive label for this transaction is a matter of some dispute. Professor
Hawkland refers to the "conditional check." Hawkland, supra note 18, at 329. White and Summers
agree with this terminology. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 453. Professor Rosenthal
criticizes the phrase because 5 3-104 requires that a check be an unconditional order to pay.
Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 49 & n. 6. Rosenthal prefers the label "the full-payment check." Id. His
approach has been followed in this Article without regard to whether the full-payment condition to
the tender appears in a transmittal letter, on a voucher, or on the payment instrument.
22. See, e.g., Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 3d 54, __, 184
Cal. Rptr. 436, 437, 34 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1, 3 (1982) (legend typed on back ofcheck stating: "This
check represents payment in full for all obligations owed by [debtor]."); Vance v. Hammer, 105
Ariz. 317, -, 464 P.2d 340, 342 (1970) ("paid in full for well drilling" written on back of check).
23. E.g. Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon, Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, Inc., 63 Or. App. 364, _.,
664 P.2d 419,420, 36 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1100, 1101 (1983).
24. Braucher, Interpretation and the Legal Effect in the Second Restatement of Contracts, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 13, 14 (1981); See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 19, 50, 53 comment c, 81
illustration 6 (1981).
25. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 452. The authors state:
Offering a check for less than the contract amount, but "in full settlement" inflicts an
exquisite form of commercial torture on the payee. If the offer is reasonable it creates a
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to wait and see whether one can get more in the long run is the
choice a litigant makes every time a settlement is offered. Indeed, it
is a choice inherent in every negotiation, whether it involves a
purchase, an investment, or an international treaty.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE
Since the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, the
effectiveness of the full-payment check to override protests by the
payee has come into doubt.2 6 Some courts have interpreted section
1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code to permit the creditor to
receive the offered check as only part payment of the debt
notwithstanding the debtor's restriction that acceptance of the
check satisfies the debt. The Supreme Court of South Dakota and
the New York Court of Appeals have ruled that a creditor may use
a full-payment check "under protest" and still pursue payment of
any balance claimed due.2 7 The courts of California and other
states disagree. 28 This controversy has cast a shadow of uncertainty
over what has long been a valuable settlement mechanism.
This portion of the Article will explore the drafting history of
the Code in order to examine any inferences that may be drawn
from the history of section 1-207 and from other provisions that
were contained in earlier drafts of the Code or that may now be
marvelous anxiety in some recipients: "Shall I risk the loss of $9,000.00 for the
additional $1,000.00 that the bloke really owes me?"
Id. This evocative language immediately conjures up images of the Chinese water torture.
26. See Hawkland, supra note 18, at 329-30.
27. See Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., Inc., 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
1591 (N.Y. 1985); Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490, 492, 20 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 833, 836 (S.D.
1976).
28. See, e.g., Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774, 779, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1454,
1456 (Alaska 1983); Pillow v. Thermogas Co. of Walnut Ridge, 644 S.W.2d 292, 294, 35 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. 1404, 1405 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982); Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc., 134
Cal. App. 3d 54, -, 184 Cal. Rptr. 436, 439, 34 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1, 6 (1982); R.A. Reither
Constr., Inc. v. Wheatland Rural Elec. Ass'n, __ Colo. App. -, 680 P.2d 1342, 1344, 38
U.C.C. REP. SERv. 420, 422 (1984); American Food Purveyors, Inc. v. Lindsay Meats, Inc., 153
Ga. App. 383 .... 265 S.E.2d 325, 326, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 966, 967 (1980); Stultz Elec.
Works v. Marine Hydraulic Eng'g Co., 484 A.2d 1008, 1012, 39 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1186, 1191
(Me. 1984); Chancellor, Inc. v. Hamilton Appliance Co., 175 N.J. Super. 345, __, 418 A.2d
1326, 1330, 30 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 12, 18 (1980); Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc, 44 N.C. App.
454, -, 261 S.E.2d 266, 269, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 3, 6 (1980); Les Schwab Tire Centers of
Oregon, Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, Inc., 63 Or. App. 364, -, 664 P.2d 419, 421, 36 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 1100, 1104 (1983); KCF Constr., Inc. v. Amper, 36 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 369, 376 (Pa. Com.
Pl. 1983); Hixson v. Cox, 633 S.W.2d 330, 332, 39 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 783, 785 (Tex. Civ. App.
1982); Gallagher Lumber Co. v. Shapiro, 137 Vt. 139, -, 400 A.2d 984, 986 (1979); State Dep't
of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash. App. 671, 682, 610 P.2d 390, 396, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
1284, 1292 (1980); Flambeau Prods. Corp. v. Honneywell Information Sys., 116 Wis. 2d 95, -,
341 N.W.2d 655, 664, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1441, 1452 (1984);Jahn v. Burns, 593 P.2d 828, 830,
26 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 257, 258 (Wyo. 1979).
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found in the statute.
The drafting history of the Uniform Commercial Code and of
section 1-207 does not clearly indicate whether section 1-207 was
designed to affect the common law of accord and satisfaction. The
section has been included in the Code since the earliest drafts
essentially without change, as has its comment. 29 When the Code
was first offered for adoption by the states during the 1950s, the
New York Law Revision Commission studied section 1-207, along
with the rest of the Code. 30 The Report of the New York Law
Revision Commission describes the section as affecting the law of
waiver and estoppel when disputes arise during the performance of'
a contract. It does not mention accord and satisfaction. 3'
Similarly, the 1962 Recommendations of the Editorial Board
for the Uniform Commercial Code, which were issued in response
to the criticisms of the New York Law Revision Commission,
suggest no change to section 1-207 or its comment and fail to refer
to accord and satisfaction. 32 The section was included in the revised
version of the Code offered to the states for enactment in 1962 and
has been adopted by the states without change. 33
The official comment to section 1-207 states that the section
"provides machinery for the continuation of performance along the
lines contemplated by the contract despite a pending dis-
pute .... , ,3The comment does not refer to accord and satisfaction
29. See U.C.C. S 1-207 (1952); U.C.C. 5 902(3) (Proposed Final Draft No. 2 1948); U.C.C. §
902(3) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 1948); U.C.C. § 901(3) (Tent. Draft No. 4 1948); U.C.C. §
101(3) (Tent. Draft No. 3 1947); U.C.C. § 101(3) (Tent. Draft No. 2 1947).
30. N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT FOR 1955, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE (1955).
31. See id. at 204-06. The report of the commission provides in part:
(1) The buyer must pay at the contract rate for any goods accepted; (2) Acceptance of
goods by the buyer precludes rejection of the goods accepted and if made with
knowledge of a non-conformity cannot be revoked because of it unless the acceptance
was on the reasonable assumption that the non-conformity would be seasonably cured
but acceptance does not of itself impair any other remedy provided by this Article for
non-conformity.
Id. The analysis states:
The policy of 2-607(1) and (2) seems to be that actions speak louder than words,
that the buyer becomes liable for the price (when due) on acceptance with knowledge,
etc. It may be argued that section 2-607 as a specific provision will necessarily make an
exception to section 1-207. But this rule does not or should not apply if section 1-207
expresses the more basic over-riding policy. Furthermore, may there not be other
situations under contracts falling within the scope of Articles 3-9 where the policy of
making a party decide promptly where he stands will be a more just one than the policy of
permitting a unilateral reservation of all rights? If there are, then section 1-207 will
work injustice in such cases unless they are specifically covered by a provision like that
of section 2-607(2).
Id. at 206 (emphasis in original).
32. See Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commerical Code, REPORT No. 1 (1962).
33. See U.C.C. § 1-207 (1962). Seealso State Correlation Tables, U.C.C. REP. SERV. (1979).
34. U.C.C § 1-207 official comment, 11.
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
or settlement offers. Instead, the comment refers to continuing
performance "along the lines contemplated by the [original]
contract ' 1 5 and "a specific measure on which a party can rely as
he makes or concurs in an interim adjustment in the course of
performance. ' 36 Thus neither section 1-207 nor its comment
clearly indicates that the section should be applied when a debtor
offers a check as payment in full settlement of a disputed claim.
3 7
Prior to 1956, the Uniform Commercial Code included section
3-802(3), which provided: "Where a check or similar payment
instrument provides that it is in full satisfaction of an obligation the
payee discharges the underlying obligation by obtaining payment
of the instrument unless he establishes that the original obligor has
taken unconscionable advantage in the circumstances." 3 8 Thus the
language of the early section 3-802(3) embraced and validated all
common law accords and satisfactions. Further, as will be
developed below, the section eliminated the common law
requirement that the pre-existing duty rule be satisfied. The
purpose and scope of section 3-802(3") were clearly described in its
comment, which stated:
Checks are frequently given with a term providing
that they are 'in full payment of all claims,' or similar
language. The holder who obtains payment of such a
check, takes its benefits subject to the drawer's stipulation
that he releases the original obligation. Even where the
obligation is for an undisputed and liquidated debt there
is no unfairness in the tender of an accord and
satisfaction; and in this respect subsection (3) changes the
law in a number of states.
The exception stated as to unconscionable advantage
taken by the obligor has been recognized in a
considerable number of decisions. A genuine accord and
satisfaction is to be found only where the parties are
dealing at arm's length and on fair terms of bargaining
equality, without unfair advantage taken by either
party .0
The 1952 version of the Code, which contained the above, also
35. Id.
36. U.C.C. S 1-207 comment, 2 (emphasis added).
37. Hawkland, supra note 18, at 331.
38. U.C.C § 3-802(3)(1952).
39. Id. comment 5.
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included section 1-207 and its comment in a form identical to that
present in today's uniform version. 40 As Professor Rosenthal has
noted, the presence of both sections seems to indicate section 1-207
was not intended to affect accord and satisfaction. 41 Because section
3-802(3) so clearly dealt with the subject in the context of payment
instruments, the inference to be drawn is that section 1-207 must
have been drafted to address some other problem. 4
2
Subsection (3) of section 3-802 was deleted from the 1957
Official Edition of the Code. In its 1954 report, the Editorial Board
explained the deletion with the comment that subsection (3) had
"evoked criticism on the ground that it would work hardship, and
was open to abuse." 4 3 A close reading of the rejected section 3-
802(3) shows that it went far beyond merely validating the existing
law of accord and satisfaction. In line with the abrogation of the
pre-existing duty rule found elsewhere in the Code, section 3-
802(3) would have permitted the full-payment check to operate
even when there was no dispute.4 4 Thus section 3-802(3) would
have operated far more broadly than the common law doctrine,
which was exclusively a settlement mechanism. 45 It is impossible
now to determine the nature of the criticism that prompted the
drafters to delete section 3-802(3), but it seems highly probable that
it was evoked, in major part, by the provision's validation of the
use of the full-payment check outside the dispute settlement realm.
Notwithstanding the deletion of section 3-802(3), section 1-207
and its comment were carried through the various drafts of the
Code, in language virtually identical to that found today. 46 This
fact strengthens the inference that section 1-207 was not intended to
influence the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 47
The comment to section 1-207 was not, changed when section 3-
802(3) was dropped, although some change to refer to accord and
satisfaction would have been logical if the drafters had understood
the section to alter the common law. 48 The report of the exhaustive
study of the Code conducted by the New York Law Revision
40. U.C.C. § 1-207 (1952).
41. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 61.
42. Several commentators have suggested the purpose of S 1-207 is to permit the parties to
proceed with performance of a contract after a dispute has arisen without fear of waiver or estoppel.
E.g., Hawkland, supra note 18, at 331; Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 63-64.
43. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, DECEMBER 1954 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXT THEREOF 25 (1955).
44. U.C.C. § 3-802(3) (1952).
45.6 A. CORBIN, Supra note 2, § 1278.
46. See U.C.C. S 1-207 (1962); id(1972); id. (1978).
47. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 60-61.
48. Id.
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Commission, which was being published at the same time that 3-
802(3) was being dropped, does not refer to accord and satisfaction
in its comments on section 1-207 and makes no cross-reference to
section 3-802(3) in its discussion of section 1-207. 49 The failure of
either the New York Law Revision Commission or the Editorial
Board to make any cross-reference between sections 3-802(3) and 1 -
207 during this process, and the failure of the Editorial Board to
revise section 1-207 or its comment to refer to accord and
satisfaction strengthen the inference that no effect was intended.
Other provisions of the Code seem inconsistent with an intent
to displace accord and satisfaction. Section 1-103, of course,
provides that except as displaced by the particular provisions of the
Code, the principles of law and equity shall supplement its
provisions. 50 In instances where the drafters desired to alter or
reverse a common law rule, care was taken to indicate that intent in
the comments to the particular section. 51 The drafters quite clearly
stated that section 3-802(3) was designed to expand the availability
of the full-payment check to satisfy obligations. 52 The language of
section 1-207 and its comment have only an oblique relationship, if
any, to the full-payment check. The lack of any reference in the
comments of section 1-207 to accord and satisfaction has been
interpreted as a further indication that the section was not designed
to affect the common law rule. 53
Other provisions of the Code abolish the pre-existing duty rule
and permit the modification of contractual obligations without the
existence of consideration. 54 Section 3-802(3) was consistent with
this rejection of the need for consideration to validate contractual
modifications and settlements. The Code embodies a policy that
the common law prerequisite of new consideration should not
hinder parties who wish to voluntarily modify their existing
contractual obligations. The effect of the original section 3-802(3)
was identical.
49. N.Y. LAW REVISION COKIM'N, supra note 30, at 330-32.
50. U.C.C. S 1-103.
51. See U.C.C. S 2-205, comment 1; id. S 2-209, comment 1.
52. U.C.C. S 3-802(3), comment (1952).
53. McDonnel, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Implications for
Jurisprudence, 126 PA. L. REv. 795, 827 (1978).
54. See U.C.G. § 1-107; 2-209(1); 3-605; 5-105. Section 2-209(1) specifically states that "[a]n
agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs no consideration to be binding." Id. S 2-
209(1). Section 1-107 provides that "[a]ny claim or right arising out of an alleged breach can be
discharged in whole or in part without consideration by a written waiver or renunciation signed and
delivered by the aggrieved party." Id. § 1-107. Section 3-605 provides: "The holder of an
instrument may even without consideration discharge any party (a) in any manner apparent on the
face of the instrument or the indorsement ... ; or (2) by renouncing his rights by a writing signed and
delivered or by surrender of the instrument to the party to be discharged." Id. S 3-605. In article 5,
governing letters of credit, § 5-105 provides that "[n]o consideration is necessary to establish a credit
or to enlarge or otherwise modify its terms." Id. § 5-105.
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When the drafters focused their attention on accord and
satisfaction, they apparently regarded it as another form of
settlement or modification and chose not only to preserve it, but to
expand its availability through the explicit language of section
3-802(3). A construction of section 1-207 that impairs the
availability of accord and satisfaction therefore would have directly
conflicted with the evident purposes of section 3-802(3). Had
complete rejection of accord and satisfaction been intended when
section 3-802(3) was deleted, it seems very strange that no change
was made in section 1-207 or its comments. Rather, the inference is
strong that throughout the drafts section 1-207 was intended only to
permit parties to continue performing agreements notwithstanding
disputes over the performance that was due.
IV. POST-CODE JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ACCORD
AND SATISFACTION
A. AN OVERVIEW
Judicial consideration of whether section 1-207 alters the
common law effect of accepting a full-payment check has been slow
and sparse. The courts are now divided, with South Dakota 55 and
New York56 adhering to the position that the creditor's protest can
prevent an accord and satisfaction. A decision from Alabama
suggests that section 1-207 alters the rule. 57 There is an unresolved
division among the Florida courts of appeal between the New York
position and the view that section 1-207 does not affect the common
law. 58 Decisions in fifteen other states take the latter view.5 9
55. See Scholl v. Tallman, 247 N.W.2d 490, 492, 20 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 833, 836 (S.D. 1976).
See also infra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
56. See infra notes 83-136 and accompanying text.
57. Bivins v. White Dairy, 378 So. 2d 1122, 1124, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 316, 318 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1979).
58. compare Eder v. Yvette 13. Uervey Interiors, Inc., 407 So. 2d 312, 314, 33 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 146, 149 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (S 1-207 does not alter common law) with Miller v. Jung,
361 So. 2d 788, 789, 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1085, 1086 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)(§ 1-207 does alter
common law).
59. The following states have held that S 1-207 does not affect the common law: Alaska
(Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774, 779, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1454, 1457 (Alaska
1983)); Arkansas (Pillow v. Thermogas Co. of Walnut Ridge, 644 S.W.2d 292, 294, 35 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. 1404, 1405-06 (Ark. Ct. App. 1982)); California (Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Gus
Kroesen, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 3d 54, 61, 184 Cal. Rptr. 436, 439, 34 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1, 5-6
(1982)); Colorado (R.A. Reither Constr. Co., Inc. v. Wheatland Rural Elec. Ass'n, 680 P.2d 1342,
1344, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 420, 422 (Colo. 1984)); Georgia (American Food Purveyors, Inc. v.
Lindsay Meats, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 383, -, 265 S.E.2d 325, 327, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 966, 969
(1980)); Maine (Stultz Elec. Works v. Marine Hydraulic Eng'g Co., 484 A.2d 1008, 1011, 39
U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1186, 1190 (Me. 1984)); New Jersey (Chancellor, Inc. v. Hamilton Appliance
Co., 175 N.J. Super. 345, -, 418 A.2d 1326, 1330, 30 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 12, 16 (N.J. Dt. Ct.
1980)); North Carolina (Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App. 454, -, 261 S.E.2d
266, 269, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 3, 6-7 (1980)); Oregon (Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon, Inc. v.
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Michigan courts note the dispute but have refused to rule on it. 60 A
number of other state courts have issued opinions dealing with
protests to full-payment checks with6ut mentioning section 1-207,
despite the fact the Code was in effect in the respective states prior
to the issuance of the opinions. 61
The courts have employed two distinct analyses to determine
whether the Uniform Commerical Code governs the full-payment
check. 62 The lower courts of New York focused on the transaction
that led to the dispute which the offeror seeks to resolve. Their
reasoning was that when the Code governs the underlying
transaction, section 1-207 must therefore also apply. 63 These courts
then stressed the language of section 1-207, regarding words of
protest, and the New York Annotation 64 and, without further
analysis of the section, concluded that the provision permits the
Ivory Ranch, Inc., 63 Or. App. 364, __, 664 P.2d 419, 423, 36 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1100, 1106-07
(1983)); Pennsylvania (KCF Constr., Inc. v. Amper, 36 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 369, 376 (Pa. Com. Pl.
1983)); Texas (Hixson v. Cox, 633 S.W.2d 330, 331, 39 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 783, 784-85 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1982)); Vermont (Gallagher Lumber Co. v. Shapiro, 137 Vt. 139, __, 400 A.2d 984, 986
(1979)); Washington (State Dep't of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash. App. 671, 682, 610 P.2d
390, 395-96, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1284, 1291-92 (1980)); Wisconsin (Flambeau Prods. Corp. v.
Honeywell Information Sys., 116 Wis. 2d 95, -, 341 N.W.2d 655, 663-64, 37 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 1441, 1451-52 (1984)); Wyoming (Jahn v. Burns, 593 P.2d 828, 829, 26 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
257, 258 (Wyo. 1979)).
60. See Fritz v. Marantette, 404 Mich. 329, 337-38, 273 N.W.2d 425, 428-29, 25 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 625, 629-30 (1978).
61. See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
62. Most of the courts that have considered the effect of § 1-207 upon the common law have
rejected the New York interpretation of S 1-207 and ruled that the provision does not alter the
common law of accord and satisfaction. Many of these courts have not analyzed whether or not the
Uniform Commercial Code is applicable, apparently reasoning that the issue is irrelevant when the
doctrine of accord and satisfaction will apply regardless of the coverage of the Code. See, e.g.,
Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 3d 54, -, 184 Cal. Rptr. 436,
438-39, 34 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1, 3-6 (1982).
63. Compare Continental Information Sys. Corp. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 77 A.D. 2d 316,
432 N.Y.S.2d 952, 955 (1980) (sale of goods) and Kroulee Corp. v. A. Klein & Co., 103 Misc. 2d
441, -, 426 N.Y.S.2d 206, 207, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 969, 972 (1980) (sale of aluminum foil)
with Geelan Mechanical Corp. v. Dember Constr. Corp., 97 A.D.2d 810, -, 468 N.Y.S.2d 680,
681, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1458, 1459-60 (1983) (plumbing contract) and Blottner, Derrico, Weiss
& Hoffman, P.C. v. Fier, 101 Misc. 2d 371, __, 420 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1002 (1979) (legal services).
64. The New York annotation to 5 1-207 states: "This section permits a party involved in a
Code-covered transaction to accept whatever he can get by way of payment, . .. without losing his
right to . . . sue for the balance of the payment, so long as he explicitly reserves his rights." N.Y.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAW § 1-207 New York Annotations (1964).
In response to an inquiry, Professor Hogan, one of the authors of the New York annotation
stated:
I cannot find anything memorializing the reason for the comment on accord and
satisfaction. Next, I do have some recollection about the topic but I offer no warranty
about its accuracy or helpfulness. We looked at the Law Revision Commission studies
and at the annotations of other states in doing the work. My recollection is that
Massachusetts also had similar references. I do recall discussing the question with Bob
Braucher (the other author) but we concentrated on the effect of the payee's striking
the customary "payment in full" legend from the check upon the drawee bank's
liability for failure to obey the drawer's order.
Letter from Professor Hogan to Patricia Fry (June 8, 1983) (discussing U.C.C. 's comment on accord
and satisfaction).
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offeree to override any form of offer by using words of protest. 65
These courts failed to apply basic contract principles to determine
whether the full-payment condition constituted an offer of a
modification of the original contract.
Another analysis initially focuses on the check, which is the
normal form of payment. Under this analysis, which was adopted
by the New York Court of Appeals, the first step is to explore the
provisions of article 3 that might govern the effect of payment or
use of the full-payment check. 66 Section 3-802 provides that the
"underlying obligation" for which a check is tendered is satisfied
pro tanto. 67
Thus, when a full-payment check is tendered section 3-802
requires that we determine what "underlying obligation" is being
paid: the original debt or the accord. 68 If section 1-207 permits the
creditor to use the check while reserving the right to claim that a
balance remains due, it would seem the "underlying obligation"
referred to in section 3-802 is the original debt. 69 If, on the other
hand, section 1-207 does not apply to the acceptance or rejection of
a proposed settlement, the "underlying obligation" would be the
performance offered in the accord.70
The latter construction is consistent with the traditional
approach, which regarded the accord as a separate, executory
agreement that was performed by the satisfaction. 71 The offer of an
accord constitutes an offer to settle or modify the existing, disputed
relationship between the parties. 72 When the accord is performed,
the original claims are satisfied. This satisfaction is not the result of
performance or payment of the original claims, but the result of the
parties' agreement to accept a different performance. 73 Under the
common law, the debtor can be certain the check will either be
returned unused and all claims still subject to litigation, or the
check will be used and the account satisfied. 74 Under the New York
65. See, e.g., Aguiar v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 114 Misc. 2d 828, __, 452 N.Y.S.2d
519, 522-23, 34 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 6, 9-11 (1982).
66. See Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 321, 488
N.E.2d 56, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1591 (1985).
For a discussion of Horn Waterproofing, see infra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
67. U.C.C. § 3-802(1).
68. Id.
69. This is true because, under this construction of § 1-207, the check is applied against the
balance due on-the original, disputed transaction. See, e.g., Horn Waterprooling Corp. v. Bushwick
Iron & Steel Co., Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 321, -, 488 N.E.2d 56, 62, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310,316, 41 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. 1591, 1598 (1985).
70. Since the operation of a satisfaction is the performance of the accord, the check would then
satisfy the obligation.
71. 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 2, S 1271 (1962) at 95-96.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS S 281(1) (1979).
73.6 A. CORBIN, supra note 2, § 1276 at 115.
74. Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 54-55.
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construction of section 1-207, however, the check may be used
"under protest" and the account balance still pursued. The
debtor's risk escala'tes. If the debtor wants to offer a settlement, the
debtor gambles that the check will not be used "under protest"
despite the terms of the offer. 75 The burden in the event of litigation
shifts to the debtor, requiring it to recapture funds previously paid
if the creditor tries to litigate the claim.
The courts that have decided whether section 1-207 should
displace the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction are
divided, and the history of the provision is ambiguous. In light of
the diverse approaches taken by the courts as they confront the
meaning of section 1-207, we will examine the decisions in some
detail.
B. PROTEST PREVENTS ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
The first state to clearly rule -that section 1-207 permits a
creditor to override a debtor's restriction on a full-payment check
was South Dakota. In Scholl v. Tallman, 76 relying on dicta in Baillie
Lumber Co., Inc. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp. 77 and Hanna v. Perkins,78
75. Hawkland, supra note 18, at 332, 342.
76. 247 N.W.2d 490,20 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 833 (S.D. 1976).
77. 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 480 (1969). In Baillie Lumber, an
action for the balance due for lumber sold, the court found'there was no dispute regarding the goods
delivered or the balance due. Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342,
__ 167 S.E.2d 85, 89, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 480, 480 (1969). The debtor had proposed a
composition with its creditors, which was accepted by the plaintiff on the condition that payment be
made before a specified date. Id. at -, 167 S.E.2d at 89, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 480-81. Since
there was no dispute regarding the underlying transaction and the payment was made over five
months after the specified date, the court ruled that no accord and satisfaction had resulted. Id. at
-, 167 S.E.2d at 89, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 484. However, the Baillie Lumber court went on
to state:
Applying the provisions of [§ 1-207] to the facts of this case, it is clear that Baillie
by indorsing the checks, "With reservation of all our rights, 'complied with that
portion of the statute requiring an explicit rights. . . . We hold that Baillie, by
its indorsement with explicit reservations, did not accept the second check in full
payment but in the manner provided in [§ 1-207] reserved its right to collect the
remainder of its unpaid bill.
Id. at __, 167 S.E.2d at 93, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 484. A later panel of the North Carolina Court
of Appeals distinguished Baillie Lumber by stating: "There is some language in Baillie Lumber Co.
v, Kincaid Carolina Corp., supra, which would support a different result. That case involved a fully
liquidated claim. It is not precedent for this case. " Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App.
454, -, 261 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1980).
78. 2 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1044 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1965). Hanna involved an undisputed claim for
goods and services and the court, on that ground, denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment. Hanna v. Perkins, 2 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1044, 1045-46 N.Y. Co. Ct. 1965).
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the South Dakota Supreme Court ruled that section 1-207
permitted the creditor to override a full-payment limitation. 79 The
Scholl opinion was later followed in Simpson v. Norwesco. 8 0
The essence of the ruling, however, was that section 1-207 did
not affect pre-Code South Dakota law. South Dakota had rejected
common law accord and satisfaction. 8' Decisions in the state had
construed a pre-Code South Dakota statute to require written
acceptance by a creditor before an accord and satisfaction would be
effective. 8 2 As far as this writer can determine, South Dakota was
the only state that had rejected common law accord and
satisfaction.
The largest body of decisions ruling that section 1-207 alters
the common law rule had been issued by the courts of New York.
These decisions understandably rely heavily on the New York
annotation, which explicitly states that section 1-207 permits the
creditor to take a full-payment check and still collect any remaining
balance .83
The first reported decision mentioning section 1-207 in
connection with an accord and satisfaction was Hanna v. Perkins,84 a
1965 decision of the Westchester County Court. In Hanna, the
creditor submitted a bill for labor and materials, and the debtor
sent a check for a lesser sum, bearing the legend "[i]n full for labor
and material to date.''85 The creditor crossed out these words,
wrote "[d]eposited under protest" and then used the check.8 6 The
trial court refused the debtor's motion for summary judgment,
finding there was a triable issue of fact whether there was any
genuine dispute. 87 The court went on to state, however:
Also taken into consideration by the court was § 1-207 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. . . . If it were not that
this court finds that triable issues of fact are present, this
court would deny the motion by holding this particular
section of the code would seem to favor plaintiff's
79. Scholl v. Tallnan, 247 N.W.2d 490, 492, 20 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 833, 835-36 (S.D. 1976).
80. 442 F. Supp. 1102, 1107 (D.S.D. 1977), aff'd, 583 F.2d 1007 (8th Cir. 1978).
81. Scholl, 247 N.W.2d at 492-93, 20 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 836.
82. Id. at 491-92, 20 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 834.
83. See supra note 64.
84.2 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1044 (N.Y.Co. Ct. 1965).
85. Hanna v. Perkins, 2 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1044 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1965).
86. ld.
87. Id. at 1045-46.
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overriding indorsement of 'Deposited under protest' as a
reservation of his right to collect payment of balance. 8
Three years later, in Lange-Finn Construction Co. v. Albany Steel
Iron Supply Co., 89 the Supreme Court of Albany County considered
the impact of section 1-207 in an action for conversion of a check. 90
Upon completion of work the plaintiff general contractor delivered
a statement and a check marked "[flinal payment POA 75-1" to
the defendant supplier. 91 The defendant challenged a backcharge
arising out of defective materials. 92 To compromise, the plaintiff
then sent a second check in a slightly larger sum, again marked
'final payment,' along with a cover letter explaining the higher
figure and demanding return of the first check. 93 Instead of
complying, defendant had both checks certified and paid. The
plaintiff filed suit for conversion of the first check. 94
The court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
for conversion of the first check. 95 In response to the plaintiff's
claim that the use of the second check constituted an accord and
satisfaction, the court pointed out there was no protest prior to
certification and therefore section 1-207 would not apply. 96 In
dicta, however, the court suggested section 1-207 altered the
common law rule, referring to the New York annotation for
authority, 97 as well as Professor Hawkland's article98 and Baillie
Lumber. 99
In 1979, two New York courts disagreed over the applicability
of the Code to non-sales transactions. In Ayer v. Sky Club, Inc., 100 the
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department ruled that
section 1-207 enabled a reservation of rights to prevent an accord
and satisfaction. 10' The dispute was apparently between a landlord
88. Id. at 1046.
89. 94 Misc. 2d 14, 403 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
90. Lange-Finn Constr. Co. v. Albany Steel & Iron Supply Co., 94 Misc. 2d 14, 403 N.Y.S.2d
1012, 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).




95. Id. at _, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 1014, 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 13.
96. Id. at __ 403 N.Y.S.2d at 1015, 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 14.
97. Id. at 403 N.Y.S.2d at 1014, 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 13. For the text of the New
York annotation, see supra note 64.
98. Id. at __, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 1014, 24 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 14 (citing Hawkland, The Effect
of U. C C. S 1-207 on the Doctrine ofAccord and Satisfaction by Conditional Check, 74 CoM. 329 (1969).
99. Id. For an analysis of Baillie Lumber, see supra note 77.
100. 70 A.D.2d 863, 418 N.Y.S.2d 57, 27 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 881 (1979), appeal dismissed, 48
N.Y.2d 705 (1979).
101. Ayer v. Sky Club, Inc., 70 A.D.2d 863, __, 418 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58, 27 U.C.C. REp. SRV.
881, 882 (1978), appeal dismissed, 48 N.Y.2d 705 (1979).
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and a tenant. The court said, "We perceive the transaction
underlying the billing dispute . . . to be one in which, while
occurring in an area to which the statute . . . might not
expressly apply, nevertheless, the rule of the statute should be
applied .... ''102
That same year in Blottner, Derrico, Weiss & Hoffman, P.C. v.
Fier, o3 the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County,
refused to apply section 1-207 in an attorneys' fee dispute. 10 4 The
action was based on an agreement to pay for services rendered to a
third party. The defendant objected to the fees as excessive and
tendered a full-payment check. 10 5 The attorney responded with a
letter objecting to the condition, but used the check. 106 Focusing on
the underlying transaction, the Blottner court stated: "[I]t cannot,
in an area where [the Uniform Commercial Code] clearly does not
apply, be the basis for the overturning of the long and well settled
rule that the acceptance of a check in full payment of a disputed
claim operates as an accord and satisfaction of the claim." 107
Neither the Ayer nor the Blottner courts questioned whether
section 1-207 changes the rule on full-payment checks. Each
appears to accept the idea that a reservation of rights by the payee
of such a check will be effective if the original transaction was
within the Code.
In three 1980 decisions, New York courts ruled that section 1-
207 allows a reservation of rights to override a full-payment check
or other full-payment tender. In each case, the transaction giving
rise to the disputed accounts was within the scope of article 2.108 A
fourth 1980 case arose out of printing services, and, without
discussing whether section 1-207 applied, the court found an accord
and satisfaction had occurred. 109
Since 1980, the decisions of the trial and intermediate
appellate courts in New York have been quite consistent. If the
underlying transaction was within the Uniform Commercial Code,
the courts have ruled that a creditor's protest was effective to
prevent the operation of an accord and satisfaction when a full-
102. Id. (emphasis added).
103. 101 Misc. 2d 291, 420 N.Y.S.2d 999, 27 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 882 (1979).
104. Blottner, Derrico, Weiss & Hoffman, P.C. v. Fier, 101 Misc. 2d 291, -, 420 N.Y.S.2d
999, 1001,27 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 882, 885 (1979).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at-., 420 N.Y.S.2d at 1002, 27 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 885.
108. Kroulee Corp. v. A. Klein & Co., 103 Misc. 2d 371, -, 426 N.Y.S.2d 206, 207, 28
U.C.C. REP. SERV. 969, 971 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (sale of aluminim foil); Continental Information Sys.
Corp. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, 77 A.D.2d 316, __, 432 N.Y.S.2d 952, 955, 31
U.C.C. REP. SERV. 816, 820 (1980) (sale of goods); Braun v. C.E.P.C. Distrib., Inc., 77 A.D.2d
358, -, 433 N.Y.S.2d 447, 449, 30 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 8, 10 (1980) (sale of goods).
109. Wilcox Press, Inc. v. Beauty Fashion, Inc., 73 A.D.2d 988, -, 423 N.Y.S.2d 565, 566,
28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1,2 (1980).
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payment check has been tendered. 110 However, if the underlying
transaction was not covered by the Code, the common law rules of
accord and satisfaction have governed and the creditor's protest has
been unavailing.' 11
One danger to the certainty of business expectations has
developed in these cases. The potential exists that a court may
apply the Code in close cases where the transaction does not clearly
fall within its coverage and where the parties might not be expected
to anticipate such a ruling. An example of such a decision may be
found in Aguiar v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 112 where a dispute
arose out of a publisher's claimed wrongful use of photographs., 13
The photographer had authorized the publisher to reproduce the
photographs "[s]olely for one-time, non-exclusive, U.S. English
language, hard cover, single edition rights .... 1114 Some copies of
the book in which the pictures were reproduced were shipped to
and sold in Canada. The photographer demanded additional
compensation and a dispute arose, which Harper & Row attempted
to resolve by the use of a full-payment check. 115 After the check was
deposited under protest, suit was filed for additional compensation
and the publisher contended that an accord and satisfaction had
resulted. 116
The court reasoned that the sale of rights to use photographs
was more analogous to the sale of goods than services, and that
therefore this was not a case where the Code clearly did not
apply." 7 The court denied the publisher's motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that section 1-207 prevented the
operation of an accord and satisfaction. I"8
The decisions in Ayer, 119 Blottner, 120 and Aguiar1 2 1 present one of
the best arguments for rejecting an analysis based on whether the
underlying transaction was Code-covered. Under the analysis
utilized by these New York courts, if the underlying transaction is
clearly within the coverage of the Code, section
110. See, e.g., Slavenburg Corp. v. Kenli Corp., 36 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 8, 13 (D.E.D. Pa. 1983)
(applying New York law).
111. Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., 105 A.D.2d 684, -, 481
N.Y.S.2d 125, 127, 39 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 776, 778-79 (1984).
112. 452 N.Y.S.2d 519, 34 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 6 (1982).
113. Aguiar v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 519, 520, 34 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
6, 7(1982).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 520-21, 34 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 7-8.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 522, 34 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 10.
118. Id. at 523, 34 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 11.
119. See supra note 100.
120. Seesupra note 103.
121. Seesupra note 112.
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1-207 prevents the operation of accord and satisfaction. In cases
where the underlying transaction is clearly not within the coverage
of the Code, section 1-207 will not operate and a full-payment
check may be used to effect an accord and satisfaction. In still other
cases, the underlying transaction may or may not be governed by
the Code. In those cases, the parties are unable to predict whether
or not an accord and satisfaction can be effected. As other courts
have noted, this can only result in confusion.1 22 Sophisticated
parties will be able to resolve their affairs without concern, but
unsophisticated parties will have their expectations upset. The
courts are not encouraging parties to settle their disputes; the courts
are encouraging them to litigate. 1 23
In October 1985, the New York Court of Appeals first
considered the application of section 1-207 to an accord and
satisfaction in Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co.,
Inc. ,'124 and rejected any analysis based upon whether the
transaction that gave rise to the dispute was within the Uniform
Commercial Code.1 2 5 The case involved a dispute over repairs to a
leaking roof.1 26 The court ruled that using a negotiable instrument
to make a payment renders the payment itself "undeniably a Code-
covered transaction.' 127
However, the court of appeals refused to follow the lead of
other states which have ruled that section 1-207 does not alter the
common law of accord and satisfaction. 1 28 The defendant had sent
a check in response to the bill for repair services bearing the
notation "[t]his check is accepted in full payment, settlement,
satisfaction, release and discharge of any and all claims and/or
122. In his dissent to the per curiam opinion in Horn Waterproofing, Justice Weinstein stated that
there is conflicting authority in New York regarding the application of 5 1-207 to nonsales cases,
citing Ayer, He argued that S 1-207 should be applied whether or not the transaction was Code-
covered and that any creditor should be able to override a full-payment condition. 105 A.D.2d at
, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 129-30, 39 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 779-82 (Weinstein,J., dissenting).
123. Flambeau Prods. Corp. v. Honeywell Information Sys., 116 Wis.2d 95, -, 341 N.W.2d
655, 663 (1984). See also Rosenthal, supra note 18, at 71-74.
124.66 N.Y.2d 321,488 N.E.2d 56, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1591 (1985).
125. Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 321, -, 488
N.E.2d 56, 61-63, 497 N.Y.S.2d 310, 315-17, 41 U.C.C. REP. SEtv. 1591, 1599-1601 (1985).
126. Id. at __, 488 N.E.2d at 56, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 310, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1592. In
Horn Waterproofing, the parties orally agreed that the plaintiff would repair a leaking roof on the
defendant's building. Id. After two days work, the plaintiff concluded that a new roof was needed
and submitted a bill for work already done. Id. The defendant disputed the amount charged and the
plaintiff revised the bill from $1,244 to $1,080. Id. The defendant remained unsatisfied, and sent the
plaintiffa full-payment check in the amount of $500. Id.
127. Id. at __, 488 N.E.2d at 61, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 315, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1599.
128. See id. at -, 488 N.E.2d at 58 n.3, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 312 n.3, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at
1594 n.3. The court in Horn Waterproofing noted that "an admittedly greater number ofjurisdictions
have held that the common law rule is not affected [by S 1-2071." Id. For a discussion of those
jurisdictions holding that § 1-207 does not alter the common law of accord and satisfaction, see supra
note 58, and infra notes 137-200 and accompanying text.
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demands of whatsoever kind and nature. '"129 Plaintiff Horn
Waterproofing printed the words "Under Protest" beneath the
full-payment legend, indorsed and deposited the check into its
account. 130 The court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment
for defendant, ruling that section 1-207 enabled the plaintiff to
override the full-payment legend. 131 The court relied heavily on the
New York annotation and the comments of Professors White and
Summers, and stated:
Indeed, the common law doctrine of accord and
satisfaction creates a cruel dilemma for the good faith
creditor in possession of a full payment check. Under that
rule, the creditor would have no other choice but to
surrender the partial payment or forfeit his right to the
remainder. We are persuaded, however, that the
common law was changed with the adoption of § 1-207
pursuant to which a fairer rule now prevails. 132
The court of appeals acknowledged that one of the purposes of
the Code was to make the law among the various jurisdictions
uniform. 133 It is unfortunate that the New York Court of Appeals
nevertheless has chosen to reject the analysis of other thoughtful
courts and commentators.134 In the final footnote to its opinion the
court suggested that the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws should "give serious thought to a clarifying
revision."' 135 However, the court emphasized that the ruling in
Horn Waterproofing would remain the law of the State of New York
until such a revision was made by the commissioners and adopted
by the New York legislature. 136
C. PROTEST INEFFECTIVE TO BLOCK ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
Prior to 1979, despite critical academic comment, judicial
129. 66 N.Y.2d at -, 488 N.E.2d at 57, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 310, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at
1592.
130. Id.
131. Id. at __, 488 N.E.2d at 62-63, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. AT 1901.
132. Id. at -, 488 N.E.2d at 59, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 313, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1596
(citation omitted).
133. Id. at -, 488 N.E.2d at 62 n.l, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 316 n.ll, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at
1601 n. 11 (citing U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c)). Section 1-102(2)(c) of the Code provides: "Underlying
purposes and policies of this Act are . . . (c) to make uniform the law among the various
jurisdictions." U.C.C. S 1-102(2)(c).
134. For a discussion of those jurisdictions holding that S 1-207 does not alter the common law
of accord and satisfaction, see supra note 58, infa notes 137-200, and accompanying text.
135. 66 N.Y.2d at -, 488 N.E.2d at 62 n. 1l, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 316 n.l, 41 U.C.C. REP.




opinion consistently held that a debtor's attempt to effect an accord
and satisfaction could be blocked by a protesting creditor. 137 This
position was buttressed by the views expressed by White and
Summers in their treatise,' 138 and by dicta in several cases. 139 The
first indication that this position would not prove to be conclusive
came, perhaps appropriately, from a Western court.
On April 23, 1979, the Wyoming Supreme Court handed
down its opinion in Jahn v. Burns, 140 ruling that an accord and
satisfaction had been effected despite an attempt to protest the full-
payment condition contained on a full-payment check. 14' The
check had been issued by one of the parties to an automobile
accident, bearing a full-payment legend and accompanied by a
letter stating that it was intended as payment in full for all personal
and property damages resulting from the collision. 4 2 The plaintiff
crossed out the full-payment legend on the check, wrote on the back
of it that it was "[d]eposited under protest and with full reservation
of all my rights," and then endorsed and cashed the check. 4 3 On
-appeal from the grant of summary judgment for the defendant, the
plaintiff argued that no accord and satisfaction had been
consummated because of the protest. 4 4 The Wyoming Supreme
Court found the langugage of section 1-207 to be clear and not
applicable to the transaction. 45 The court relied heavily on
Professor Hawkland's comment that the section was not designed
to affect accord and satisfaction, but rather was intended to permit
parties to proceed with the performance of a contract without fear
of waiver. 14 6
The plaintiff inJahn v. Burns had also argued that section 1-207
was applicable to the case despite the fact that the underlying
transaction was not Code-covered because of the fact that a check,
governed by article 3, was used. 147 Addressing itself to that issue,
the Wyoming Supreme Court agreed with plaintiff that the use of a
check would involve article 3, but only to the extent that the issues
of a case arose out of the interpretation, transferability,
negotiability, rights of holders, and other aspects of the instrument
137. See supra notes 83-102 and accompanying text.
138.J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at 453-54.
139. See, e.g., Bivins v. White Dairy, 378 So. 2d 1122, 1124, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 316, 318
(Ala. Civ. App. 1979); Baillie Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342, -_, 167
S.E.2d 85, 91,6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 480, 484 (1969).
140. 593 P.2d 828, 26 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 257 (Wyo. 1979).




145. Id. at 830, 26 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 259.
146. Id. at 830-31, 26 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 260 (citing Hawkland, supra note 18, at 31).
147. Id. at 829, 26 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 260.
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itself. 148 The Jahn court stated that the use of a check did not turn
the entire transaction into a commercial transaction. 149
Finally, apparently in response to an argument that the policy
of uniformity should persuade the court to follow the decisions in
New York and South Dakota, the court quoted White and
Summers to the effect that "from time to time a court bows to this
policy, but in most cases the court seems more concerned that its
decision be right than that it be parallel with another state's. "150
With great clarity, the Wyoming Supreme Court said that it
considered its disposition of the matter to be correct whether or not
other courts had ruled to the contrary. 151
A few weeks earlier, the Vermont Supreme Court, in Gallagher
Lumber Co. v. Shapiro,152 rendered a somewhat cryptic opinion
which may be read to sustain an accord and satisfaction in the face
of a protest and in the face of claims that the Uniform Commercial
Code had changed the rule. 5 3 The issuer of a check had disputed a
balance claimed due for materials furnished by an architect and
had tendered a full-payment check. The check was negotiated
after the architect inked out the full-payment condition. 154 In
ruling that an accord and satisfaction had resulted despite the
protest, the court did not refer to section 1-207. However, the court
did state that the common law rule is not affected by the Uniform
Commercial Code and cited section 1-103, which provides that the
Code does not displace supplementary general principles of law. 155
The opinion thus suggests that the issue was argued to the court
and rejected by it.
The following year, in Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 156 the
Court of Appeals of North Carolina also ruled that an accord and
satisfaction had occurred despite the attempt by the payee to
protest a full-payment condition.157 A panel of that court, in Bailie
Lumber Co. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 158 had earlier opined that
section 1-207 permitted a creditor, by such a protest, to override a
full-payment condition. 159 The Brown court distinguished the Baillie
148. Id. at 831-32, 26 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 260-61.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 832, 26 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 261 (citingJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 4, at
9).
151. Id.
152. 137Vt. 139, 400A.2d 984 (1979).
153. Gallagher Lumber Co. v. Shapiro, 137 Vt. 139, __, 400 A.2d 984, 985-86 (1979).
154. Id. at .,400 A.2d at 985.
155. Id. at.., 400 A.2d at 986.
156. 44 N.C. App. 454, 261 S.E.2d 266, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 3 (1980).
157. Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App. 454, - , 261 S.E.2d 266, 267, 28
U.C.C. REP. SERV. 3, 4(1980).
158. 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 480 (1969).
159. Baillie Lumber Co., Inc. v. Kincaid Carolina Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342, -_, 167 S.E.2d
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Lumber decision, pointing out that the case had involved an attempt
to compromise a fully liquidated, nondisputed claim and thus the
language regarding the effect of a full-payment check was dicta. 160
The Brown court, as did the Wyoming Supreme Court in Jahn v.
Burns, ruled that section 1-207 applies to continuing performance
under an existing contract. 161 It pointed out that when a creditor
protests a full-payment condition, the requested performance is
being refused. 161
The Brown court also had to confront the question of whether
section 1-207 should be considered when the original transaction
was not within the ambit of the Uniform Commercial Code. The
dispute in Brown was between a salesman and his former employer
over the balance of commissions owing to the salesman. 163
Contrary to the Jahn court, the Brown court reasoned that the use of
the check brought the Code into play in this transaction. 164 Citing
section 3-802, which regulates the effect of a check on an
underlying transaction, the court held "that whether the defendant
is discharged on the plaintiff's claim depends on the extent to which
he is discharged on the check. The employment contract is subject
to the Uniform Commercial Code to this extent. ",165
At about the same time, the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled
that a protest did not prevent the operation of an accord and
satisfaction in American Food Purveyors v. Lindsay Meats, Inc. 166 That
court was not persuaded by the decision injahn and stated that the
contrary views were more persuasive. 167 However, it concluded
that the 1976 opinion of the Georgia Supreme Court in Anderson v.
Shelby Mutual Insurance Co., 168 which had not discussed the impact of
section 1-207, precluded it from reaching the question of whether
section 1-207 altered the common law rule. 169
A third appellate court directly addressed the question in a
decision rendered approximately a month later. In State Department
of Fisheries v. J-Z Sales Corp., 170 the Washington Court of Appeals
85, 93, 6 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 480, 484 (1969). For a discussion of the opinion in Bailie Lumber, see
supra note 76.
160. Brown, 44 N.C. App. at __, 261 S.E.2d at 269, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at 7.
161. Id. at -, 261 S.E.2d at 268, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 6. SeeJahn, 593 P.2d at 830-31, 26
U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 260.
162. Brown, 44 N.C. App. at __, 261 S.E.2d at 268, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 6.
163. Id. at __, 261 S.E.2d at 267, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 4.
164. Id. at __, 261 S.E.2d at 268, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 6-7.
165. Id.
166. 153 Ga. App. 383, -, 265 S.E.2d 325,326, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 966, 966-67 (1980).
167. American Food Purveyors v. Lindsay Meats, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 383, -, 265 S.E.2d
325, 327, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 966, 967 (1980).
168. 237 Ga. 687, 229 S.E.2d 462 (1976).
169. American Food Purveyors, 153 Ga. App. at.-, 265 S.E.2d at 327, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at
967.
170. 25 Wash. App. 671, 610 P.2d 390, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1284 (1980).
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did feel at liberty to address the impact of section 1-207 despite
post-Code common law decisions. 171 The dispute in that case arose
out of estimates that had been used by the parties in calculating the
extent of the obligation incurred by J-Z Sales when it agreed to
purchase all surplus salmon carcasses and eggs from the
department of fisheries. 172 The quantity that the department
actually tendered to J-Z Sales far exceeded the estimates, and the
market was poor. 173 J-Z Sales accepted all of the carcasses and eggs'
tendered after being advised, in response to its protests, that
adjustments would be made. Adjustments were never made,
however, and J-Z Sales was billed at the original contract price. A
full-payment check was tendered, returned a month later, and then
retendered. 174
The Washington court first analyzed the case under the
common law of accord and satisfaction and determined that a
common law accord and satisfaction had occurred. 7 5 It then turned
its attention to the impact of section 1-207 on the transaction, an
issue raised for the first time on appeal. This court ruled that
section 1-207 did not apply to accord and satisfaction, which
involves an offer of a new contract rather than performance under
the original. 176
By the end of 1980, it was thus apparent that the once
consistent rulings that section 1-207 alters the common law had not
carried the tide. A strong division among the courts had developed
and, outside of New York, the courts were rather consistently
rejecting claims that the section changes the common law rule.
Since then, a substantial number of states have ruled that the New
York position is wrong.
An excellent exemplar of these cases, and one which has
generated some comment, is the 1984 decision of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Flambeau Products Corp. v. Honeywell Information
Systems, Inc. 177 The lower courts in Wisconsin had been faced
several times with arguments that section 1-207 alters the common
law of accord and satisfaction, and the court of appeals had adopted
the New York position in it's Flambeau decision. 178 The Wisconsin
171. State Dep't ofFisheries v.J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash. App. 671, 682, 610 P.2d 390, 395, 28
U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1284, 1292 (1980).
172. Id. at 673, 610 P.2d at 391, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1285.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 674-75, 610 P.2d at 392, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1286.
175. Id. at 676-81,610 P.2d at 292-95, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1290-91.
176. Id. at 682, 610 P.2d at 395-96, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1292.
177. 116 Wis. 2d 95,341 N.W.2d 655, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1441 (1984).
178. Flambeau Prods. Corp. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 317, 122-24,
330 N.W.2d 228, 231, 35 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1397, 1403 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 116 Wis. 2d
95, 341 N.W.2d 655, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1441 (1984).
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Supreme Court disagreed. 179
Flambeau Products Corporation had purchased computer
equipment from Honeywell Information Systems under a contract
that provided an allowance for programming services. °8 0 In late
1976 or early 1977, Flambeau asked Honeywell for the amount
necessary to prepay the balance on the contract. 81 In January
1977, Flambeau sent a full-payment check for a lesser sum, along
with a letter stating that the check was in full payment and
indicating that it had deducted the cost of the unused programming
services from Honeywell's prepayment demand.18 2
The check and letter were received by a lock-box depositary
used by Honeywell to process incoming checks. 8 3 Contrary to its
authority under its agreement with Honeywell, the lock-box
processed and deposited the full-payment check.1 84 Immediately
upon learning of the deposit, Honeywell wrote to Flambeau stating
that it did not agree to the deduction and demanding the remaining
balance, plus interest.18 5 However, Honeywell did not return any
of the proceeds from the cashed check to Flambeau. 186
Flambeau brought an action for declaratory relief against
Honeywell and was granted a summary judgment by the trial
court. 8 7 On the first appeal, the case was remanded to the trial
court because the record contained no evidence of a disputed or
unliquidated claim. 18 8 After trial on remand, judgment was once
again granted to Flambeau on the grounds that an accord and
satisfaction had been effected.18 9 Honeywell Information Systems
appealed this judgment and the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled
that section 1-207 operated to permit Honeywell to retain the
proceeds of the check without being bound to an accord and
satisfaction. 90
The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the
judgment for Flambeau.' 91 That court did not find the language of
179. Flambeau Prods. Corp. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 116 Wis. 2d 95, __, 341
N.W.2d 655,667, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1441, 1452 (1984).
180. Id. at __,341 N.W.2d at 657, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1442.
181. Id.
182. Id. at __, 341 N.W.2d at 657-58, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1442-43. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court pointed out that the facts are set out in detail in the decision of the court of appeals
and merely summarized those facts in its decision. Id. at -_, 341 N.W.2d at 657, 37 U.C.C. REP.
SERv. at 1442. All further citations to the facts in this article will be taken from the decision of the
court of appeals.







190. 111 Wis. 2d at 325, 330 N.W.2d at 231, 35 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1403.
191. 116 Wis. 2d at . , 341 N.W.2d at 667, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1452.
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the statute and its comment as persuasive as had theJahn court, 192
nor did it find the legislative history of the section particularly
enlightening. 193 Noting the conflict in the decisions, the Flambeau
court looked to section 1-102 which provides that the Code is to be
liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes
and policies. 94 The court noted that section 1-102(2) provides that
one of those purposes is to simplify, clarify and modernize the laws
governing commercial transactions. The court stated that applying
section 1-207 to the full-payment check would not accomplish these
purposes.1 95 It would instead eliminate a simple technique for
settlement while permitting sophisticated parties to arrange their
affairs to secure the benefits of the full-payment check. 196 The court
pointed out that the common law doctrine of accord and
satisfaction rests both on principles of contract law and public
policy, the policy of encouraging the informal resolution of disputes
without litigation and the policy of fairness. 197 It disagreed with the
view of the court of appeals that it would be unfair to require
Honeywell to return the proceeds of the check if it wished to
preserve its claim to the balance, and stated:
The interests of fairness dictate that a creditor who cashes
a check offered in full payment should be bound by the
terms of the offer. The debtor's intent is known, and
allowing the creditor to keep the money disregarding the
debtor's conditions seems unfair. and violative of the
obligation of good faith which the UCC makes applicable
to every contract or duty. 198
192. Id. at -, 341 N.W.2d at 659-60, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1444-47.
193. Id. at __ , 341 N.W.2d at 661-62, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1448-50. The court also
pointed out that the Wisconsin comment suggested that the section was intended to apply to fact
situations other than full-payment checks. Id. at -_, 341 N.W.2d at 661, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at
1447. The Wisconsin comment to 5 1-207 states:
[Section 401.2071 provides a method of procedure whereby one party claiming a
right which the other party feels to be unwarranted can make certain that the fact that
he proceeds with or promises or assents to performance will not operate as a waiver of
his claim to such right; there is no similar general provision in the present law, though
the policy ofWis. Stat. S 121.49 is similar.
WIs. STAT. § 401.207 comment (1964).
194. 116 Wis. 2d at __, 341 N.W.2d at 662, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. at 1450.
195. Id.
196. Id. at ,341 N.W.2d at 663, 37 U.C.C. REp. SERV. at 1450.
197. Id. at , 341 N.W.2d at 663, 37 U.C.C. REp. SERV. at 1451.
198. Id. See also 6 A. CORBIN, supra note 2, at 396-97. Corbin states as follows:
It is unfair to the party who writes the check thinking that he will be spending his
money only if the whole dispute will be over, to allow the other party, knowing of that
reasonable expectation, to weasel around the deal by putting his own markings on the




It is apparent on reading the opinion of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Flambeau that the most persuasive arguments
were those premised on the public policies of encouraging informal
settlement of disputes and fairness. The court was not impressed by
Honeywell's argument that a debtor might be guilty of
overreaching but nonetheless protected by the doctrine of accord
and satisfaction. It pointed out that overreaching can be policed
through the doctrine of good faith, that the parties in the case dealt
at arm's length and that both understood the usual effect of
commercial practices. 199 The utility of accord and satisfaction as a
simple device for settling disputes without litigation and the fairness
of requiring the creditor to accept the burdens of the offered accord
if it wished to enjoy its fruits outweighed, in the eyes of the
majority, the claim that the full-payment check gave an unfair
advantage to the debtor.2 0 0
D. OTHER POST-CODE CASES
Since the adoption of the Code, a number of decisions have
been reported which are based on the common law rule and fail to
mention section 1-207.201 It generally cannot be determined
whether the failure to consider section 1-207 resulted from the
failure of counsel to raise the issue, 202 the rejection of such an
argument, the fact the underlying transaction was not Code-
covered, or for some other reason. 20 3 The fact remains, however,
199. 116 Wis. 2d at -, 341 N.W.2d at 667.
200. Id.
201. E.g., Vance v. Hammer, 105 Ariz. 317, 464 P.2d 340 (1970) (well-drilling contract);
Quaintance Assoc., Inc. v. PLM, Inc., 95 11. App. 3d 818, 420 N.E.2d 567 (1981) (executive
recruiting services); Cole Assoc., Inc. v. Holsman, 181 Ind. App. 431, 391 N.E.2d 1196 (1979)
(construction subcontract); Ingraham Concrete Structures, Inc. v. Champion Shipyards, Inc., 423
So. 2d 752 (La. Ct. App. 1982) (site preparation contract); Eppling v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 363
So. 2d 1263 (La. Ct. App. 1978) (realty appraisals); A.R. Guglielmo, Inc. v. Weber, 315 So. 2d 427
(La. Ct. App. 1975) (construction contract), cert. denied, 323 So. 2d 133 (1975); Charles X. Miller,
Inc. v. Oak Builders, Inc., 306 So. 2d 449 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (construction contract); Graffam v.
Geronda, 304 A.2d 76 (Me. 1973) (sale of oil); Air Power, Inc. v. Omega Equip. Corp., 54 Md.
App. 534, 459 A.2d 1120 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1983) (court refused to consider issue bicause not
raised below); Goes v. Feldman, 391 N.E.2d 943 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979) (landlord-tenant dispute);
Dix v. Trigger Contractors, Inc., 337 So. 2d 694 (Miss. 1976) (agreement to move and reassemble
drilling rig); Henderson v. Eagle Express Co., 483 S.W.2d 767 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972) (wage
disputes); Growers Cattle Credit Corp. v. Swanson, 184 Neb. 612, 169 N.W.2d 692 (1969)
(promissory notes); Swaner v. M.P. Smith Constr. Co., Inc., 526 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. App. 1975)
(construction contract). But see Stultz Elec. Works v. Marine Hydraulic Eng'g Co., 484 A.2d 1008,
39 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1186 (Me. 1984) (section 1-207 does not alter common law rule); Milgram
Food Stores, Inc. v. Gelco Corp., 35 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 31 (W.D. Mo. 1982) (holding that the
Missouri courts would rule that S 1-207 does not alter common law rule).
202. E.g., Air Power, Inc. v. Omega Equip. Corp., 54 Md. App. 534, 459 A.2d 1120, 1124
(1983).
203. In several cases, the courts have noted the issue but refused to rule on it. See, e.g., Kelly v.
Kowalsky, 186 Conn. 618, __, 442 A.2d 1355, 1357, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 801, 803 (1982) (court
found no common law accord and satisfaction had occurred); Fritz v. Marantette, 404 Mich. 329,
__, 273 N.W.2d 425, 429, 25 U.C.C. REp. SERV. 625, 630 (1978) (determination reserved
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that the common law rule of accord and satisfaction has been
applied in a number of jurisdictions subsequent to the enactment of
the Code.
V. CONCLUSION
As the cases construing section 1-207 now stand, the highest
courts of New York and South Dakota have ruled that the provision
affects the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 20 4 The
highest courts of Alaska, 20 5 Maine,2 0 6 Vermont, 20 7 Wisconsin 20 8
and Wyoming20 9 have, on the other hand, ruled that section 1-207
does not affect the common law doctrine of accord and satisfaction.
Intermediate appellate courts in Arkansas, 2 10  California, 2 1 1
Colorado, 2 12  Georgia, 213  North Carolina, 214  New Jersey, 2 15
Oregon, 21 6 Texas21 7 and Washington 2 8 have agreed. In Florida,
there is division in the intermediate courts, 21 9 and in other states
decisions continue to be based upon the common law doctrine
without discussion of section 1-207.220 In other words, the numbers
alone seem to suggest that a consensus is emerging that the doctrine
of accord and satisfaction has survived intact.
A court will not need to address the issue until a case presents
pending further developments in case law and commentary); Kilander v. Blickle, 280 Or. 425, -,
571 P.2d 503, 505, 23 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 16, 18 (1977) (en banc) (the creditor did not protest the
full-payment condition before cashing the checks).
204. See supra notes 76-136 and accompanying text.
205. Air Van Lines, Inc. v. Buster, 673 P.2d 774, 779, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1454, 1456
(Alaska 1983).
206. Stultz Elec. Works v. Marine Hydraulic Eng'g Co., 484 A.2d 1008, 1011, 39 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 1186, 1189 (Me. 1984).
207. Gallagher Lumber Co. v. Shapiro, 137 Vt. 139, -. , 400 A.2d 984, 986 (1979).
208. Flambeau Prods. Corp. v. Honeywell Information Sys., Inc., 116 Wis. 95, -, 341
N.W.2d 655, 662, 37 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1441, 1450 (1984). See supra notes 177-200 and
accompanying text.
209. Jahn v. Burns, 593 P.2d 828,830, 26 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 257, 259 (Wyo. 1979). See supra
notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
210. Pillow v. Thermogas Co. of Walnut Ridge, 6 Ark. App. 402, -, 644 S.W.2d 292, 296,
35 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1404, 1405 (1982).
211. Connecticut Printers, Inc. v. Gus Kroesen, Inc., 134 Cal. App. 3d 54, 61, 184 Cal. Rptr.
436, 439, 34 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1, 3 (1982).
212. R.A. Reiter Constr., Inc. v. Wheatland Rural Elec. Ass'n, - Colo. App.....
680 P.2d 1342, 1344, 38 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 420, 422 (1984).
213. American Food Purveyors, Inc. v. Lindsay Meats, Inc., 153 Ga. App. 383, -, 265
S.E.2d 325, 327, 28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 966, 969 (1980).
214. Brown v. Coastal Truckways, Inc., 44 N.C. App. 454, -, 261 S.E.2d 266, 268, 28
U.C.C. REP. SERV. 3, 6 (1980).
215. Chancellor, Inc. v. Hamilton Appliance Co., 175 N.J. Super. 345, __, 418 A.2d 1326,
1330, 30 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 12, 18(1980).
216. Les Schwab Tire Centers of Oregon, Inc. v. Ivory Ranch, Inc., 63 Or. App. 364, -,
664 P.2d 419, 421, 36 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1100, 1104 (1983).
217. Hixson v. Cox, 633 S.W.2d 330, 331, 39 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 783, 784 (Tex. Civ. App.
1982).
218. State Dep't of Fisheries v.J-Z Sales Corp., 25 Wash. App. 671, 682, 610 P.2d 390, 395-96,
28 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1284, 1292 (1980).
219. Compare Miller v. Jung, 361 So. 2d 788, 789 (Fla. Dist, Ct. App. 1978) with Eder v. Yvette
B. Gervey Interiors, Inc., 407 So. 2d 312, 314 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
220. See supra, notes 201-203 and accompanying text.
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
itself in which each of the common law elements is present: a bona
fide dispute between the parties, an offer of payment now in full
settlement of the dispute which is communicated to the other party,
and that party's use of the proffered check of payment while seeking
to reserve the right to claim more. 22 1 Only when these elements are
present will a court be required to consider whether or not section
1-207 is relevant.
If the problem is raised, the analysis should be divided into
two parts. The first issue is whether or not the Uniform
Commercial Code applies to the problem at all. Although this issue
may be resolved without discussion in cases where the underlying
transaction was a sale of goods, this author believes the issue should
be resolved by the utilization of analysis under article 3 of the
Code.2 22 Section 3-802 deals with the effect of the use of a check as
payment and article 3 clearly applies to all checks. Most attempted
accords involve the use of the full-payment check, and one uniform
rule would be preferable. An analysis that results in one rule for
some transactions and a different rule for other transactions would
result in confusion at the expense of the least-informed.
Deciding that the Code does govern the effect of the full-
payment check still leaves the critical issue to be determined:
whether or not section 1-207 alters the common law rule. The
language of the section refers to the original transaction between
the parties. The comment addresses the effect of estoppel and
waiver where a party makes demands under the original contract.
The section is clearly applicable when demands are made under an
existing agreement. It is designed to permit a party to continue to
perform without having to fear that such continued performance,
or receipt of less than the agreed performance, will operate as an
estoppel or waiver . 22 3
The section does not clearly apply, however, to offers of
modification or settlement. An accord and satisfaction is a second
contract which operates to settle disputes that have arisen. 22 4 The
policy of the Code, as indicated by numerous other provisions,
seems to be to facilitate settlement agreements by abandoning the
pre-existing duty rule and permitting parties to freely modify
221. See, e.g., Kelly v. Kowalsky, 186 Conn. 618, 442 A.2d 1355, 1357, 33 U.C.C. REP. SERV.
801, 803-04 (1982); Kilander v. Blickle Co., 280 Or. 425, __, 571 P.2d 503, 504, 23 U.C.C. REP.
SERv. 16, 17 (1977)(en banc).
222. Seesupra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., Shea-Kaiser-Lockheed-Healy v. Dep't of Water & Power, 73 Cal. App. 3d 679,
__, 140 Cal. Rptr. 884, 888, 22 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 607, 611 (1977) (gravel was delivered under
protest after excessive demands were made under a supply contract).
224. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
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existing contractual relations .225 Nothing in .the language of section
1-207 indicates that it was intended to be an exception to this
policy. The history of the drafting of the Code seems to indicate
that the drafters did not view the provision as affecting accord and
satisfaction.
Finally, no reason or need to alter the common law rule of
accord and satisfaction has been suggested. Some writers with
whom this author has discussed the issue have indicated
dissatisfaction with the common law rule. The New York Court of
Appeals has expressed displeasure, a sense that the common law
rule permits a debtor to take unfair advantage of the creditor. 226
This author believes the displeasure results from a failure to
recognize the identity of a full-payment check as a useful and
valuable settlement mechanism. Any overreaching by the debtor
was resolved by the common law and can be resolved under the
Code through the duty of good faith expressed in section 1-203.
Contrary to the view of Professors White and Summers, an accord
and satisfaction is merely a particular kind of settlement offer, and
all settlement offers present the offeree with a dilemma - should I
take what I can get now or hold out for more? One rule for a
settlement offer embodied in a legend on a full-payment check and
another rule for any other settlement offer seems incongruous, to
say the least. 2 7
In the absence of any clear indication that section 1-207 was
designed to alter the common law rule, the better approach appears
to be that the doctrine of accord and satisfaction survives intact.
Thus our two issues are resolved by holding that the Uniform
Commerical Code does apply to the transaction, through article 3,
but that the Uniform Commercial Code does not alter the existing
common law rule. The creditor who receives a full-payment check
to settle a disputed account must decide whether to accept the
money in hand or reject it and try to get more.
225. See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
226. See Horn Waterproofing Corp. v. Bushwick Iron & Steel Co., Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 321, __,
488 N.E.2d 56, 59, 497 N.Y.S. 2d 310, 313, 41 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 1591, 1596 (1985).
227. But see Shanker, The Folly of Full Settlement Checks - anda Declaration of Their Independenie, 90
CoNt. L.J. 7 (1985) (arguing that the use of checks should be confined to the transfer of credit and an
accord and satisfaction should occur only if the offer is made outside the payment instrument itself).
